ThE FDA REsponDs
The Law and the Public's Health column by Wood and Perosino, which appears in this issue (p. 527), 1 illustrates some of the complexities the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) encounters in ensuring the integrity of its processes, while making every effort to base them on the best available science. Achieving this dual task is particularly challenging when selecting outside members of FDA's advisory committees (ACs), who provide our agency with invaluable expertise on the safety and effectiveness of medical and other regulated products. This is because their understanding of these products' benefits and risks is often in part the result of research conducted on the product at issue or on competing products, and the associated financial arrangements frequently raise the question of potential conflicts of interest (COIs).
Moreover, statutes and regulations administered by the FDA require evaluation of financial relationships not uniformly recognized as COIs. For example, AC members are assumed to share their employers' financial interests. Accordingly, the law imputes to a university professor a grant that the university has received even if that grant does not support or relate to the professor's work. To a lesser extent, financial ties to manufacturers of regulated products may also complicate the selection of the committee's patient and consumer representatives.
The FDA has confronted this problem on numerous occasions and has repeatedly strengthened its policies to ensure that COI concerns do not undermine public confidence in the ACs' recommendations and discussions, which are valuable sources of information for the agency. In 2006, the success of these efforts was confirmed in a study by Lurie et al., which concluded that, "excluding advisory committee members and voting consultants with conflicts would not have altered the overall vote outcome at any meeting studied." 2 A careful read of Lurie's article also suggests that, for the meetings he studied, committee members tended to vote in a manner inconsistent with their disclosed financial interests. 3 Nevertheless, we continue to strengthen measures to protect the AC system against inappropriate influences. For example, in recent months our agency issued two draft guidances 4, 5 and took several other steps to address its procedures on AC voting and disclosure of COI information.
One of the draft guidances, published last Novem-ber, calls for simultaneous rather than sequential voting and immediate announcement of voting results. This measure is aimed at protecting the integrity of the vote by eliminating the risk that members could be influenced by votes that precede their own. The second draft guidance, which in part was issued to implement FDA Amendments Act (FDAAA) requirements, sets out procedures for the public disclosure of information regarding committee members' financial interests for which the agency has granted a waiver. This guidance also included redesigned disclosure and waiver templates to make them more easily understood by the public. In addition, the FDA has improved access to waiver information on the FDA AC website and formalized procedures to protect the right to free speech at AC meetings, while ensuring their security and decorum. As Wood and Perosino point out, the FDAAA calls on our agency to take additional actions to ensure the AC system's integrity. We have implemented many of the FDAAA's requirements and are in the process of implementing the rest. We are limiting the number of waivers in accordance with the FDAAA requirement and are issuing waivers only if they meet the standards set forth in the FDAAA. We are developing new strategies for recruiting potential AC members and, as noted previously, we have published a draft guidance and we are implementing an FDAAA requirement regarding public disclosure of information on financial interests (including their type, nature, and size) for which COI waivers are granted within specified time frames before AC meetings.
The task of creating highly qualified advisory panels completely free from COIs is not as easy as it may appear from the number of academicians and other scientists who are potentially available for AC membership. A recent study by Eastern Research Group, Inc., involving 124 members participating in 16 FDA AC meetings, found that in general, those members who have received COI waivers had longer experience and greater scientific credentials as reflected in their contributions to peer-reviewed literature than members who were conflict-free. 6 The study, which was contracted by the FDA, concluded that the prospect for creating completely conflict-free ACs in all situations is uncertain and, even if possible, the involved recruiting and screening costs would be much higher than current expenditures. While we recognize these difficulties, the FDA is determined to fully implement the FDAAA and take any additional measures that may be needed to uphold the highest scientific and ethical standards for our agency's critically important AC system. and OSHA. It is significant to note that it was the beryllium industry that originated the request for this epidemiology study. Because of concerns regarding the quality of the study, NIOSH requested an independent scientific peer review of the draft study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). This review resulted in many recommended technical changes to the methods of analysis and conclusions. However, it was determined later that two of the three listed authors of the study actually submitted the paper for publication four days before the peer reviewers were to meet. The third listed author on the published study is Dr. Bayliss. The other two authors listed Dr. Bayliss on the study without his permission. Dr. Bayliss was originally the primary researcher on this study and had already published two NIOSH reports on his work. When this study was published, he raised his concerns over the serious shortcomings of the study to the NIOSH leadership (he had previously relayed the same concerns to the other two authors). NIOSH directed Dr. Bayliss to raise his concerns directly to CDC, which he did in a 30-page letter 3 to Director William H. Foege, MD. Dr. Bayliss' letter demonstrated that the authors failed to use the proper death rates in calculating the number of expected lung cancer deaths in the cohort. When Bayliss corrected their error, the difference between the expected death rate and the actual death rate in the cohort was no longer statistically significant. In addition, Dr. Bayliss pointed out that the authors overstated the number of actual worker deaths due to lung cancer by inappropriately including a cancer case of someone who had never worked at the plant.
The challenge to the 1975 OSHA proposal was based on evaluating the quality of the available science and the potential harm of a non-science-based standard against the continued ability of our nation to defend itself. Brush Wellman was not alone in its concern regarding OSHA's proposal to lower the PEL for beryllium based on cancer risk. OSHA's interpretation of the NIOSH study was challenged by the NIOSH science leadership, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DOD), and a coauthor on the study, as well as others. Overall, OSHA's proposal generated 150 written comments and 40 requests for a public hearing. Simply put, an open and public debate on the quality of the available science is just how a standard setting process is supposed to work.
In this case, the quality of the available science was not adequate to set a standard based on an alleged risk of cancer.
Recent studies find that beryllium should not be classified as a human carcinogen
The fundamental issue of whether beryllium is a carcinogen remains under investigation. The 15-year-old cancer ranking by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is in doubt after considering the recent studies by Levy, 4,5 Brown, 6 and Deubner, 7 which provide evidence that exposure to beryllium does not represent a significant risk of cancer to humans. The 2001 study by Sanderson 8 attempted to demonstrate a beryllium exposure response relationship for lung cancer. and identified a significant methodological error in the Sanderson study that effectively negates the use of Sanderson as a dose/response cancer link for beryllium. Levy also provides a reanalysis of the Sanderson study, which demonstrates that when the error is corrected, the resulting conclusion is that the lung cancer in this population was not at all associated with beryllium exposure, whether defined as time worked, or cumulative, mean, or maximum exposure. Deubner confirms the methodological error identified by Levy using repeated data simulations. The error in Sanderson's methodology is further recognized by an independent commentary by Dr. Garabrant 9 that was published concurrently with the Deubner paper. His commentary indicates that this finding is important and can have ramifications, which should be considered for all epidemiology studies.
These epidemiology studies deal with sizeable cohorts exposed to very high levels of beryllium, which are orders of magnitude greater than the OSHA standard. Unconvincing evidence that beryllium workers have excess rates, combined with clear evidence that lung cancer in beryllium workers is not related to degree of exposure, strongly refutes the premise that beryllium is a human carcinogen.
Studies have identified a safe exposure level for workers
While there was uncertainty and debate surrounding the identification of a safe exposure level for workers for several years, the authors' claim that there is no safe exposure level is simply wrong. Every person is exposed to airborne beryllium via windblown dusts (all soil contains beryllium), emissions from the combustion of coal, and tobacco smoke. Additionally, many household products, such as ceiling tiles, fertilizers, detergents, charcoal, and kitty litter, contain beryllium naturally. Obtaining and carefully evaluating good-quality worker exposure data is crucial to understanding CBD and setting occupational exposure limits.
With regard to identifying an occupational exposure limit for beryllium, the authors referenced both the Madl 10 and Schuler 11 studies, but failed to articulate how these studies and the studies by Johnson 12 and Cummings 13 are highly relevant and revealing in identifying an appropriate occupational exposure limit for beryllium based on the potential risk of CBD. Madl, using a large dataset of more than 3,800 personal air samples, is the first study to actually perform a complete dose reconstruction of people defined as beryllium sensitized or diagnosed with CBD. The Madl study dose reconstruction also differentiates between those people with subclinical CBD and clinical CBD. This comprehensive analysis concludes that subclinical CBD and clinical CBD occur at exposures greater than 0.4 µg/m 3 .
The authors failed to consider the strength of the scientific evidence in the study findings of Johnson et al. (2001) . Dr. Johnson studied the largest beryllium exposure air sampling dataset at a facility that had a very successful CBD prevention program. In fact, we know of no other air sampling dataset for any substance that more thoroughly characterizes a worker population. The Johnson study includes more than 217,000 personal samples using an exposure assessment strategy that monitored every worker on every day for 36 years at the United Kingdom Atomic Weapons Establishment in Cardiff, Wales. The Johnson study demonstrated that the Cardiff beryllium control model achieved compliance with the United Kingdom 2 µg/m 3 eight-hour maximum exposure limit more than 98% of the time and prevented clinical CBD.
The 2007 study by Cummings provides an analysis of the effectiveness of Brush Wellman's Beryllium Worker Protection Model, including the use of a recommended exposure guideline of 0.2 µg/m 3 . This study demonstrates that the Beryllium Worker Protection Model, in use since 2000, has been effective in reducing the detection of beryllium sensitization from more than 8% to 1%, a rate that is similar to the background rate found in the non-occupationally exposed population. The Beryllium Worker Protection Model is very similar to the successful exposure control model used at the Atomic Weapons Establishment facility in Cardiff Wales as described by Johnson (2001) .
Brush Wellman's Beryllium Worker Protection Model 14 is a comprehensive and multifaceted approach for reducing occupational exposure to beryllium particles. The model focuses on keeping beryllium work areas clean and keeping particles and solutions containing beryllium out of the lungs, off the skin, off of clothing, in the work process, in the work area, and on the plant site. Worker and management education and motivation are important components. A combination of engineering, work practice, and personal protection approaches are used as needed to attain the reduction in potential occupational exposure. The goal of the Beryllium Worker Protection Model is to prevent sensitization to beryllium, subclinical CBD, and clinical CBD. The Beryllium Worker Protection Model is based on our knowledge, experience, and understanding gained from the most recent joint studies with NIOSH, which include the potential exposure risks posed by the various chemical forms of beryllium and disease prevention methods tailored to specific material processing operations, engineering, work practice control, and personal protective measures that have been demonstrated to be effective in preventing sensitization and CBD at Brush Wellman facilities.
The significant change in the diagnostic criteria for CBD was overlooked
A serious omission in the article is the failure to note the major change in the diagnostic criteria for CBD used in studies beginning in the late 1980s. 15 These changes are important when comparing findings of older studies to newer studies. The older studies (pre-1989) refer solely to the identification of people with clinically evident disease (clinical/symptomatic CBD), whereas the vast majority of cases identified in studies since 1989 describe predominantly surveillancedetected cases of CBD where the people have no or little clinical evidence of a health effect or symptomology. Thus, the reference to scores of people in DOE being diagnosed with CBD obscures the fact that most of these people have subclinical CBD with no clinical symptoms. This fact is highly relevant because the prevention of a material impairment of health, such as clinical CBD, is the appropriate regulatory basis to use when setting an appropriate exposure limit for beryllium.
The beryllium blood test is not a reliable worker screening test
The discussion of the Beryllium Blood Lymphocyte Proliferation Test (BeBLPT) omits the most recent study findings on this topic, namely the 2006 articles by Borak 16 and Cher 17 and the 2007 study by Donovan. 18 The Cher article identifies systematic performance problems with the labs performing the BeBLPT, and the Borak article evaluates the value of BeBLPT using World Health Organization evaluation criteria. The studies by Donovan and Cher demonstrate that the BeBLPT is not a reliable indicator of beryllium sensitization (BeS) due to the inconsistent performance of the test, the absence of a standardized method of testing, inconsistent test interpretation, the variability of test outcomes, and the reversion of positive results to normal after retesting over time. Donovan also confirms the detection of BeBLPT identified beryllium sensitization in the general non-occupationally exposed population and demonstrates, longitudinally, the on/off detection of positive BeBLPTs in individual beryllium workers.
The basis for the beryllium exposure limit was scientifically sound The authors' reference to a "taxi cab standard" is grossly misleading and fails to recount a history that is well documented. 19, 20 One of the "two scientists" cited as being involved with the development of a beryllium occupational standard was Dr. Merril Eisenbud, the preeminent authority on beryllium health and safety of the time. He and his colleagues at the Atomic Energy Commission, after considerable deliberation, decided to recommend a beryllium standard based on an empirical analogy with other toxic metals such as lead, mercury, and arsenic. Based on the assumed toxicity and relative atomic weight compared to the other toxic metals, it was determined that the occupational standard for beryllium would be set at between 2 and 5 micrograms. Only the final decision to recommend either 2 or 5 µg/m 3 as the recommended occupational exposure limit was decided during the taxi ride to the meeting at which they were to present their recommendation.
The authors repeat the misleading claim of case reports from the 1970s and 1980s that CBD was occurring at levels below the 2 µg/m 3 PEL. It has been clearly demonstrated that these studies presented exposure values that cannot be used to determine compliance with an eight-hour PEL. 21, 22 Simply put, comparing median values to a PEL ignores 50% of the exposure values above the median. Exposures in these studies typically exceeded the PEL 10% of the time. It is misleading to use these studies to test the efficacy of a PEL or to establish a new one. The following provides additional insights into the studies referenced by the authors.
Shima 23 reported only general area sample data and sampled at a frequency of two times per year as required by Japanese regulation. It is well established that exposures in the personal breathing zone of the workers would have been much higher than the area sample results used by Dr. Shima. In addition, Shima noted general area sample results as high as 40 µg/m 3 and the existence of cases of acute beryllium disease, which are known to require exposures to soluble compounds of airborne beryllium higher than 100 µg/m 3 . The Japanese beryllium standard is based upon and requires the use of area sampling.
The study by Cullen 24 has been criticized within the scientific community as not accurately representing worker exposures. Dr. Eisenbud's review of the Cullen study stated, "Since the affected employees were exposed for 10 to 20 years before the samples were collected, it cannot be said that the exposure histories were reconstructed in a meaningful way." In an article in the April 1998 IRIS, entitled "Toxicological Review of Beryllium and Compounds," 25 the Environmental Protection Agency chose not to select the Cullen study as a principal study ". . . because no historical exposure monitoring data were available and worker exposure levels were estimated using a small amount of monitoring data." In addition, Cullen himself reported in the article that 10% of the worker exposures were higher than the PEL, and air sample results ranged from 0.22 to 42.3 µg/m 3 .
In an effort to try to continue their portrayal of beryllium as posing an uncontrollable, ongoing health concern, the authors offer up 31 cases of CBD in Quebec. Almost all of the Quebec cases have been diagnosed at a copper smelting facility operated by Noranda Corporation. This facility recycled metal dross from Brush Wellman's primary beryllium operations. Before shipping its metal dross and byproducts from its beryllium alloy operations to Noranda, Brush Wellman met with Noranda to review appropriate procedures and was assured that Noranda could safely handle and recycle these drosses, which contain more than 10% beryllium and are very dusty. Brush Wellman has documented evidence that Noranda mishandled the drosses using front-end loaders and no ventilation controls. Exposures at Noranda were measured in excess of the 2 µg/m 3 PEL.
The 1999 DOE beryllium rulemaking adopted the 2.0 µg/m 3 PEL Dr. Michaels lauds the DOE's efforts to issue a "stronger beryllium exposure limit" when in fact the authors' telling of the 1999 DOE rule history should have included, with its description of the DOE action level, the key point that the DOE rule actually adopted the 2.0 µg/m 3 eight-hour PEL for beryllium. If the science challenging the 2.0 µg/m 3 PEL was as certain as the authors describe, the DOE should have had little trouble lowering the DOE's beryllium PEL as part of its rulemaking.
Clear record of customer communication
The authors' criticism of scientists within and hired by the beryllium industry as having a credibility problem that should result in a discounting of the science generated by those efforts is totally without merit. If anything, the beryllium industry has to be more certain of the science it supports or performs than anyone else because if the industry doesn't have a solid basis for its own actions and its safety recommendations to its customers, it is the beryllium industry that will suffer the legal liability and loss of business. The greatest moral and financial incentive of the beryllium industry has been and continues to be that beryllium disease is prevented by people understanding how to work safely with beryllium-containing materials.
The work that went into the adoption of Brush Wellman's Beryllium Worker Protection Model demonstrates the falsity of the authors' charge that Brush Wellman has used "public relations in lieu of science." To help answer the scientific questions about a safe exposure level for beryllium, Brush Wellman has worked cooperatively with government, academic, and private researchers on more than 40 published scientific studies since 1990.
Also false is the authors' claim that the "beryllium industry waged a concerted campaign to delay a more protective workplace standard." It was Brush Wellman that sponsored studies, conducted by the National Jewish Medical Center at its own plants, that provided the clear scientific evidence identifying the uncertainty of the effectiveness of the current OSHA PEL. Brush sent a letter to all of its customers in 1996 that stated, "At this time, it is uncertain whether persons exposed only below the standard can become sensitized to beryllium or develop clinical signs or symptoms of CBD." The letter also stated, ". . . it remains the best practice to maintain concentrations of all atmospheric contaminants as low as feasible, and continue to work to improve exposure control practices and procedures." This letter was sent three years before the DOE rulemaking was adopted.
Brush Wellman has worked tirelessly for nearly 60 years to help ensure that people work safely with beryllium-containing materials. The company first put warning labels on its products and sent letters to all of its customers warning them of the potential health hazards associated with manufacturing berylliumcontaining materials in 1949. As the scientific knowledge advanced, we updated our warnings and repeatedly sent out and made new information available to Letters to the Editor  427 Public Health Reports / July-August 2008 / Volume 123 our customers. This is hardly an example of an industry that put public relations ahead of concerns for protecting worker health. The best example of the authors' skewed presentation of industry communications is their emphasis on the Hill and Knowlton professional media relations proposal submitted to Brush Wellman. Contrary to the authors' statements, we did not hire Hill and Knowlton nor implement its proposal.
Brush Wellman continues to perform scientific studies to evaluate the potential exposure risks and has developed numerous communication tools to directly assist downstream users. An innovative tool called the Interactive Guide to Working Safely with Beryllium and Beryllium-Containing Materials (Interactive Guide) has been recently developed to communicate the elements of the Beryllium Worker Protection Model. The Interactive Guide is available on CD and operates from most personal computers. The Interactive Guide provides both employers and employees with tools and guidance to work safely with these important and beneficial materials. Upon completion of the Interactive Guide, users are provided with a printable action plan and information to address most types of operations and tasks performed on beryllium-containing materials in an industrial environment. A copy of the guide can be requested by visiting www.brushwellman.com and selecting Contact EH&S.
The societal benefits of beryllium make the world a safer place
The authors' analysis also fails to consider the incredible range of benefits beryllium-containing products bring to society. In many instances, no other material can deliver the same performance and reliability demanded of today's high technology products and systems. Beryllium metal, beryllia ceramics, and berylliumcontaining alloys are making the world a better, more connected, and safer place. You'll find them at work helping to ensure our national defense and homeland security, and saving lives through the use of beryllium in air bag sensors, fire control sprinkler heads, mammography X-ray equipment, and medical lasers.
Dr. Michaels is a paid expert witness in beryllium litigation
Dr. Michaels' has not published beryllium industrial hygiene or medical research; however, he has provided litigation support serving as a paid expert witness for plaintiffs in beryllium litigation. Consistent with this role, as a hired advocate for plaintiff's counsel, he has sought to "manufacture certainty" by applying a hind-sight approach to criticize the good works of dedicated beryllium researchers.
In closing, the authors' suggestion to end the industrial use of beryllium is not justified by their incomplete telling of the beryllium story. The scientific knowledge and methods to have workers work safely with beryllium are at hand and have been demonstrated. The authors seem to want the truth, but the number of inaccuracies and omissions in this article belie their ability to accurately convey the full truth. 
miChAELs AnD monFoRTon REsponD
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the critique by Marc Kolanz of Brush Wellman Inc. of our article on the beryllium industry's public relations efforts. 1 Kolanz's letter is an excellent example of our article's primary message-that Brush has waged a concerted campaign over many years to refute the scientific evidence of the health hazards associated with beryllium exposure. The industry's efforts have impeded the replacement of an inadequate workplace beryllium exposure standard, thus placing workers at increased risk of developing beryllium-related diseases.
For the reader who may not have our article in front of them, we presented numerous previously unpublished documents illustrating Brush's efforts to counter the observations by independent scientists that workers exposed at levels below the standard were developing chronic beryllium disease (CBD), demonstrating that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard of 2 µg/m 3 was (and continues to be) inadequate. In his letter, Kolanz does not dispute the existence nor the content of any of these documents.
Kolanz disagrees with our interpretation of various data points in the historical debate over the adequacy of the 2 µg/m 3 standard. This debate has been resolved.
As we note, and as Kolanz acknowledges in his letter, it is now abundantly clear that CBD can and does occur among workers exposed to beryllium at levels far below the current OSHA standard, and that it is necessary to reduce exposure levels by at least an order of magnitude to prevent CBD.
Kolanz has taken the occasion of our article to advance Brush's interpretation of other scientific questions that are at best tangential to our article-in each case promoting what we believe are erroneous assertions that minimize the hazards associated with beryllium exposure. We address these assertions in this response and elsewhere. 2 Because many of the documents we use in this discussion are unpublished, we have posted them on the website of the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP), 3 so that readers can decide for themselves how these historical records should be interpreted.
Compelling evidence that beryllium is a lung carcinogen
For more than 30 years, Brush Wellman has fought the labeling of beryllium as a carcinogen, motivated by fear that this would greatly reduce its ability to sell its products to downstream manufacturers. 2, [4] [5] [6] [7] As one industry document stated: "If beryllium is determined to be a carcinogen and so labeled and so regulated it would only be a matter of time until its usage would shrink to a point where it would no longer be a viable industry." 3 We believe this is the reason that Kolanz devotes a sizable portion of his letter to an attempt to show that beryllium is not a lung carcinogen, even though our article only touches briefly on beryllium's carcinogenicity.
Kolanz claims we distort the history of OSHA's efforts during the 1970s to develop a health standard to protect workers from beryllium exposure. We stand by our statement that the rulemaking was shelved following political pressure. This has been documented in a prize-winning series of newspaper articles by journalist Sam Roe 8 and confirmed by the Secretary of Energy. 9 To advance his own interpretation of OSHA's aborted beryllium rulemaking, Kolanz attempts to reopen a long-forgotten dispute from the late 1970s in which one National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH) researcher disagreed with two others. Kolanz cites only the position of the dissenting researcher, failing to note that in response to the dispute, OSHA's Assistant Secretary Eula Bingham asked Assistant Secretary for Health Julius B. Richmond to convene a panel of senior scientists to review all the epidemiologic, clinical, and experimental data to help assess whether beryllium posed a carcinogenic risk for exposed workers. 10 The reviewers concluded that "beryllium should be considered as a suspect carcinogen for exposed workers." 11 In any case, a debate over what the literature showed three decades ago is primarily of historical interest because subsequent studies, with better methods and longer follow-up, have consistently found beryllium to be a lung carcinogen. This leads to Kolanz's second erroneous assertion: that recent studies find that beryllium should not be classified as a human carcinogen. With one exception, the articles to which Kolanz refers [12] [13] [14] are not actually studies but reanalyses of studies originally conducted by NIOSH scientists. The original NIOSH studies found increased lung cancer risk associated with beryllium exposure. [15] [16] [17] Each of the reanalyses was paid for by Brush, clearly for the purpose of countering the positive NIOSH studies. Some of the same "product defense" scientists who performed the reanalyses for Brush have undertaken similar efforts for tobacco, alcoholic beverage, and coal-burning power companies. 2 The single actual study (i.e., not a reanalysis) cited by Kolanz as supporting his assertion is a study of lung cancer risk among plutonium-exposed workers, which examined exposure to asbestos, hexavalent chromium, and beryllium as possible confounders. 18 Given that the study found no association between exposure to either asbestos or chromium (two well-known lung carcinogens) and lung cancer, it is questionable at best to suggest this study provides evidence of no association between beryllium exposure and lung cancer.
Furthermore, two of the reanalyses cited by Kolanz audaciously claim to have discovered a previously unknown, serious bias in the case-control study design, 13, 14 a standard method that is widely used in contemporary epidemiology. A subsequent reanalysis and two commentaries by NIOSH and academic epidemiologists have refuted this claim. [19] [20] [21] Kolanz's assertion that "recent studies find that beryllium should not be classified as a human carcinogen" is best understood as the latest installment in decades of effort by the beryllium industry to prevent the metal being labeled a carcinogen. Over the years, Brush Wellman has advanced many arguments in an unsuccessful effort to forestall imposition of the "cancer-causing label." These arguments have been rejected by scientists who are not associated with the beryllium industry, including expert panels convened by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the U.S. National Toxicology Program (NTP). 22, 23 To grasp the extent of this campaign, readers might be interested in other failed arguments used by Brush in the past to assert that the evidence for beryllium's carcinogenicity is flawed. For example, for many years, Brush's representatives claimed the numerous animal studies demonstrating carcinogenicity were faulty 5, 24 and that the animal evidence was "highly debatable." 25 This line of argument was finally dropped when the animal evidence became so powerful it could no longer be disputed. 26, 27 Similarly, when IARC and NTP examined the scientific evidence on the carcinogenicity of beryllium, the industry attempted to claim that while the excess lung cancer risk observed in one epidemiologic study was real, the increased risk was not due to exposure to beryllium, but instead from exposure to sulfuric acid mist found in just one Brush Wellman facility. 2, [28] [29] [30] [31] Kolanz promoted this position to the NTP in his unsuccessful attempt to convince the agency that beryllium was not a human carcinogen. 32 Evidently, Brush has abandoned this argument, perhaps because it is inconsistent with its current position that the increase is spurious, caused by methodological errors.
There is no evidence for a safe level of beryllium esxposure As we document, for many years Brush held that there was no evidence that exposures lower than 2 µg/m 3 were associated with disease. This position has been rejected by the scientific community, most recently by a National Academy of Sciences Panel ("The epidemiologic evidence shows that the long-standing limit of 2 µg/m 3 is inadequate for preventing CBD" 33 ). Now, Brush reports that the firm's comprehensive "worker protection model" in which exposures are held lower than 0.2 µg/m 3 results in a sensitivity rate of 1%. This represents significant progress in preventing beryllium-related disease. In our view, however, the data from Brush's facilities are not sufficiently robust to conclude that exposure levels lower than 0.2 µg/m 3 are actually safe.
This has great relevance for public health protection and regulation. Other than Brush Wellman and the Department of Energy (DOE) contractors who manufacture nuclear weapons, we believe that many employers potentially involved in machining or recycling beryllium products do not have the capability of ensuring that workplace beryllium exposures are kept lower than 0.2 µg/m 3 .
Furthermore, there is little evidence to support the assertion that there is a 1% "background" rate of beryllium sensitivity (BeS) in non-occupationally exposed populations. Studies conducted by independent, academic scientists have reported no BeS among individuals with no exposure to beryllium. 34, 35 This also has public health implications: the supposed existence of a 1% background rate might be seen by employers as a reason not to institute a beryllium disease surveillance program, fearing that a surveillance program would identify and force them to address non-occupational background BeS cases. This would be a most unfortunate development.
The BeLPT is a useful screening tool Kolanz ignores the substantial literature on the beryllium lymphocyte proliferation test (BeLPT), citing only studies paid for by Brush. [36] [37] [38] We discuss the use of the BeLPT as a tool for estimating prevalence of disease in beryllium-exposed populations. This approach is supported by a recent review by NIOSH scientists in the Annual Review of Public Health:
Despite limitations in test consistency and repeatability, beryllium lymphocyte proliferation testing has been an invaluable tool in the identification of workplace risks in population studies and of intervention effectiveness. 39 It is noteworthy that Kolanz uses a controversial article by Borak et al. 37 to support his assertion that the BeLPT is not reliable. This article was the subject of published erratum notice, explaining that the authors failed to disclose the article was actually based on a legal work product commissioned by Brush's attorneys. 40 We believe that Brush is eager to discredit the use of the BeLPT because it is widely used to identify new CBD and BeS cases; without the use of this test, far fewer individuals would be diagnosed with berylliumrelated conditions, and beryllium would appear to be less harmful.
Subclinical beryllium disease is still beryllium disease
Physiologic changes caused by beryllium exposure, including lung granulomas, are signs of beryllium disease, whether or not the individual is symptomatic at the time. In fact, a portion of these patients actually has measurable physiologic abnormalities. 41 Furthermore, many whose asymptomatic CBD is discovered through screening go on to develop fully recognizable symptomatic disease. 42 It is not true, as Kolanz asserts, that "older studies (pre-1989) refer solely to the identification of people with clinically evident disease (clinical/symptomatic CBD)." The existence of asymptomatic beryllium disease was known at least as far back as the 1950s. In one 1955 article, for example, Harriet Hardy describes a 33-year-old woman with beryllium-caused x-ray changes but no symptoms or lung function abnormalities:
The worker has no complaints. She leads her usual life, hindered only by anxiety, because she knows of the illness and subsequent death of several young women with whom she worked at jobs similar to her own. This represents a beryllium effect not productive of symptoms, because the process does not involve enough tissue to embarrass function. 43 Strangely, Kolanz asserts, "Material impairment of health, such as clinical CBD, is the appropriate regulatory basis to use when setting an exposure limit for beryllium." This posits that asymptomatic physiologic damage is not important or relevant to the individual or to the policy maker. This theory is not supported by either common sense or OSHA's traditional approach to controlling chemical hazards (see, for example, OSHA's exposure standards protecting workers exposed to cadmium, formaldehyde, and lead). [44] [45] [46] There is no evidence that beryllium can be used safely in downstream facilities Kolanz's report on the alleged mishandling of beryllium waste products by the Noranda Corporation underscores our contention that there is affirmative evidence that beryllium cannot be used safely in downstream facilities. While Brush may have instituted an adequate protective program in its own factories, it cannot control exposures in downstream facilities where beryllium is used in manufacturing processes or is eventually recycled. According to Kolanz, the managers of the Noranda facility were aware that beryllium was a constituent of the material being recycled, yet they still did not ensure it was handled properly. Thirty-two workers developed CBD. If this occurred at a multinational-owned facility with knowledgeable managers, it seems even less likely that workers will be protected at small facilities processing uncategorized metals or electronic products. As a society, we must consider if it is necessary to risk the health of workers so that beryllium can be used as a component of disk drives, golf clubs, fishing rods, pen clips, camera shutters, and other consumer goods. 39 In addition, Kolanz has made several errors that should be corrected. We certainly disagree with his interpretation of the history of the "taxicab standard," a label affixed to it by Merril Eisenbud himself in his autobiography, in which he explains that it was so labeled "in recognition of the seemingly flimsy basis on which it was established." 47 In its rulemaking process, DOE concluded that the current OSHA standard was inadequate, but recognized "it is difficult to determine from this scientific evidence the exposure level necessary to eliminate the risk of contracting CBD." 48 DOE saw the necessity of moving quickly to protect workers with an action level of 0.2 µg/m 3 , while deferring to what was expected to be a full OSHA rulemaking that would conduct a more thorough review of the scientific literature. As we note in our article, the promise of prompt OSHA rulemaking has been unfulfilled.
Kolanz unequivocally asserts that Brush "did not hire Hill and Knowlton (H&K) nor implement their proposal." The evidence we have for our reporting of Brush's relationship with H&K is an invoice sent by the public relations firm to Brush (with accompanying note), 49 the H&K public relations program proposal, 50 an internal Brush memo talking about materials needed for the H&K initiative, 51 a letter from Brush to H&K providing "supporting information for the PR program," 52 a series of letters developed by H&K for Brush to send to its customers reassuring them of the safety of beryllium, 53 and copies of letters sent by Brush Wellman that include much of the text provided by H&K (with copies sent to H&K). 54, 55 Finally, Kolanz asserts that we have attempted to "manufacture certainty" because one of us (DM) served as an expert witness in one suit against Brush Wellman. As DOE noted in its rulemaking, protecting the health of workers exposed to beryllium does not require absolute certainty, 48 and we did not attempt to manufacture it. It is a basic public health principle that protections are implemented using the best evidence available at the time. Certainty is never required, and we do not claim that certainty was present decades ago. What we show is that independent scientists raised questions about the adequacy of the standard, and as more studies were done, it became clear these scientists were correct-workers were developing CBD at exposure levels permitted under the current standard. We document how Brush defended the inadequate standard, to the detriment of public health.
It is incorrect to suggest that the needs of litigation have somehow influenced our reporting. Lawsuits against Brush Wellman have dramatically decreased because the U.S. government has stepped in and provided compensation payments to most workers with beryllium disease, under the condition that they drop any lawsuits against the government or the beryllium industry. One of us (DM) was instrumental in developing this program, which has provided more than $100 million in compensation payments to workers with CBD or BeS. 2 The program has undoubtedly saved the beryllium industry a large amount of money and has eliminated much litigation brought by sick workers against beryllium producers.
We clearly stated that Brush Wellman has collaborated with NIOSH in a useful research initiative, and we recognize that Brush's current efforts to protect its own employees appear to be exemplary. But we also present compelling evidence that Brush has waged a public relations campaign to defend an inadequate standard, impeding government efforts to strengthen workplace protections badly needed to protect beryllium-exposed workers from serious lung disease.
Kolanz's letter is evidence that this unfortunate campaign continues. We hope that Brush has a change of heart and joins us in asking OSHA to move quickly to issue a truly protective workplace beryllium exposure standard. 
